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ABSTRACT This paper has its foundation in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory as a way of
understanding, from a scientific perspective, the human impact of material technology under
the conditions of capitalism. Two related propositions concerning material technology are
interrogated in terms of the Lacanian struggle for subjective articulation. Firstly, if following
Frederick Kittler, information and communication technologies retain their autonomy beyond
the subject, having emerged as a product of their storage, containment and repetitive usage,
and if we as subjects embody technological developments as they occur, it could be argued
that such technologies possess imaginary agency in that their ability for self-preservation and
reproduction constitutes a commanding of unending enjoyment. Insofar as this command is
enshrined within capitalism it tends to ignore subjective division and to bypass subjective
struggle with the impossibility of language. Rather than affording the subject a new language,
material technology merely hints at a contingent language yet to come. Further, in obfus-
cating the necessity for disinterest–the intellectual position–material technology operates as a
discourse which fails to capture the subject, or more precisely, lalangue. Through its inevitable
disappearance (and re-emergence transformed as another technology) material technology
localises and thereby obscures conflict within the subject. This leads to the second propo-
sition: as part of the capitalist imperative the quest for jouissance is already being played out
alongside obscured subjective struggle, spectacularly so in the case of material technology.
However, investment in this imperative has an unforeseen cost: in being confronted with
excess of jouissance we are overwhelmed and uncertain. Material technologies command that
we integrate excess into our daily lives as a unique discursive network, yet this network is at
best opaque. Here, joussiance takes the form of a distinctive compulsion emanating from
material technology’s intersection with capitalism. This in turn reconfigures the struggle in
which the subject of language is grappling with the connection (if any) between knowledge
and technological devices. In order to throw light on this struggle we could take up the
position of disinterest regarding material technology under capitalism.
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Is there an object of science (to speak of)?
F irst, let us take a step back to consider technology from theperspective of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory which situatesscience in the realm of the Lacanian Real: that which we
cannot fully know because it is not completely knowable, but
which inserts itself, sometimes confusingly, into our day to day
lives. Science and its method can be considered our Other which
Lacan explains in Seminar II (1978/1954-1955, p 236):
[w]e must distinguish two others, at least two–an other with
a capital O, and another with a small o, which is the ego. In
the function of speech, we are concerned with the Other
[emphasis original].
Lacan goes on to raise an apparently ludicrous question: why
don’t planets speak? His response is equally joking but at the same
time obliging: I don’t have a mouth (1978/1954-1955, p 236). Of
course, the inanimate object does not speak, so we are compelled
to speak for it whether it be through mathematical symbols, cal-
culations or theoretical propositions. As Lacan quickly reminds us,
that which does not have a mouth is not our radical alterity, rather
“there is absolutely nothing about [inanimate objects] pertaining
to an alterity with respect to themselves, they are purely and
simply what they are” (p 238). At the same time and despite not
having a mouth, Lacan contends that we demand planets speak a
precise language distinguishable only to us. This is an essential
reference point regarding the objects of technology. We trust in
our conviction that the scientific method is impartial and inde-
pendent and that science should therefore not have investment in
the social bond. Science must remain autonomous and operate
independently within its own logic: this is science par excellence.
Lacan’s approach to science and its method was much influ-
enced by Alexandre Koyré idiosyncratic proposal that from the
spectacle of a planet revolving in its orbit we might apprehend the
appearance (and disappearance) of the entire cosmos. This
structure Koyré presents as logical, axiomatic and intuitive not-
withstanding the precariousness of the object which includes
scientific method itself. Lacan harnessed this mathematically
based conception using his own idiosyncratic algorithms as a way
to ponder Freud’s structuring of the subject as one of both loss
and possession.
Although, given its robustness, the scientific method insists
that it be afforded scrutiny and subject to critical evaluation,
nevertheless, how scientific knowledge becomes accepted is
determined not only by peer review but also by its being subject
to influence from economic or political conditions and demands.
Here the position of disinterested scientist is no longer a given1
- there may be rewards or gifts associated with claims to
knowledge and which attempt to subvert disinterestedness.
Because the social bond makes demands, disinterestedness has a
price to pay rather than being merely a voluntary position insisted
upon by criticality. Herein lies the potential for disinterestedness
to orient speech (and therefore, arguably language) towards
symbiosis with particular knowledge investments.
Certainly, for Lacan such ambiguity in which the social bond
plays a part manifests in language. He further insists that in our
relationship with science we are asserting a larger claim: we are
demanding that material objects be inscribed into language in
order for us to be absolutely certain that we exist in a unified
symbolic field, and in this way we are a part of science par
excellence. This is a logic we can count on. Lacan’s question about
planets is making a crucial point about the inanimate object
which cannot speak. Here Lacan is suggesting that the object does
not even have an existence which is autonomous and separate
from the speaking subject because speaking subjects are neces-
sarily inscribed into the social world. Thus, Lacan’s question
about planets not speaking is a disinterested question par
excellence because it reveals that inanimate objects are not split or
divided and unlike people do not need to convey language to
themselves. Such objects afford us language whilst constraining it.
It is our questions about objects which demand that we impose
upon science a language, because we as subjects rely on language
(whether we speak or not) to represent our existence as inter-
dependent with other subjects and objects. In Écrits Lacan claims
that “I” is a way of imagining a response to and a relationship
with the world beyond the subject: Le sujet de l’énonciation and le
sujet de l’énoncé. He elaborates: “the presence of the unconscious,
being situated in the locus of the Other, can be found in every
discourse, in its enunciation” (Écrits, 1966a, b, p 834). Here, the
subject of the statement is closely correlated with what is being
enunciated. “I” is divided, represented by both the enunciation
and the enunciated. Lacan calls the subject of enunciation “the
subject not insofar as it produces discourse but insofar as it is
produced (fait), cornered even (fait comme un rat), by discourse”
(2009, p 36). The difference between “I” of enunciation and “I” of
the enunciated is the key to understanding the difference between
speech and language, as well as to determining who is speaking
the ‘truth’ of the signifier:
The division between the statement and the enunciation
means that, in effect, from the I am lying which is at the
level of the chain of the statement – the am lying is a
signifier, forming part, in the Other, of the treasury of
vocabulary in which the I, determined retroactively,
becomes a signification, engendered at the level of the
statement, of what it produces at the level of the
enunciation–what results is an I am deceiving you. The I
am deceiving you arises from the point at which the analyst
awaits the subject, and sends back to him, according to the
formula, his own message in its true signification, that is to
say, in an inverted form. He says to him–in this I am
deceiving you, what you are sending as message is what I
express to you, and in doing so you are telling me the truth
(S XI, 139–140).
That language is complicit with thinking is foundational to
Lacan’s assertion of psychoanalysis as science.2 Lacan states that
“the subject upon which we operate in psychoanalysis can only be
the subject of science” (cited in Milner, 2000, p 264). Lacan is
making two important propositions here: firstly that a subject of
science exists, and secondly that science operates in conjunction
with subjectivisation. For science to be a praxis requires media-
tion by the subject, usually via a method. Lacan implies that
science is an external form for the subject, one which the subject
must contend with as a result of being divided. We cannot deny
science any more than we can deny the unconscious forces which
constitute subjectivity. Science is not singular, it is always an open
question usually concerning the ontological and conceptual
objects and their relationships. What Lacanian psychoanalysis
undertakes is not object oriented in quite the same way: it
assumes an unwavering hypothesis from which analysis can be
undertaken via the objet a, that is, the object cause of desire. This
is the object which stands in for desire and which in turn pre-
supposes that we have an unconscious from which these forces
impact the subject consciously. Therefore, science per se cannot
be undertaken outside the subject because it in part constitutes a
subjectivity which pursues the Master. For Lacan, science, like
psychoanalysis, is a praxis “to be distinguished from the question
of knowing whether psychoanalysis is a science (i.e., whether its
field is scientific)” (Milner, 2000, p 265). Science constructs but
cannot be reduced to its constructions because it is a field which
interrogates itself. Science exists beyond those objects which
manifest in its thought. This is because science is a method from
which scientific facts or truths emerge; these may either include
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or exclude variables deemed most useful for scientific enquiry.
Thus science is controlled by the disinterested scientist even if its
outcomes are not.
In light of this, why do we still consider material technology
under capitalism to be still somehow beyond our understanding?
Is it because material technology presents as overly esoteric? Does
such a framing of technology render subjects anxious because
they are unable to recognise or know they are products of science,
which is itself a confrontation with the limits of knowledge?
Material technology is often cast as objet a (the object cause of
desire), as the subject’s desire within the discourse of knowledge.
In this way, material technology is the surplus of science, an
abundance of objects which obfuscate real questions of knowl-
edge, the most fundamental of which is our desire for a Master.
Here the domain of the Imaginary is crucial: for science an idea is
not precise unless it is scrupulous in its methodology - refined,
tested and verified. For the subject the best proof that an idea is
scientific is its recognisable, neutral and utilitarian form. Despite
the acculturation of technology as a unique subjective form,
contemporary material technology is also pragmatic in its repe-
ated use not requiring specialist knowledge (although its assem-
blage certainly does). Little scientific knowledge is required to use
material technology, even the sophisticated devices we daily use.
This apathy towards and lack regarding knowledge is the most
political manifestation of science today: we want things to work
for us, but we don’t need to know how they work, that is for
scientists to figure out for us. Such objective knowledge is reified
as real science not needed to be understood by the masses and
known only to a few. This problematically places technical
knowledge within the perceived esoteric domain of science
thereby giving material technology a certain masterful appeal, a
know-how we can count on despite us not knowing how. Here we
might ask, if we understand how it works, how the smart phone
for example, stops functioning on the level of the drive. Taking
into account the caveat that for Lacan the object is never a
consistent field but rather an interruption of the Symbolic then
this interruption is implicit in our everyday interactions with
technology experienced only when its devices are useful. This
provides consistency to our material discursivity, a consistency
which in turn acts as an interlocutor in understanding such a
dimension of social life.
Let us address this problem by asking the question, does
technology speak? This question directly implicates the subject as
one who tries to capture the Other as a precise function and form
of speech thereby inviting the further question of whether tech-
nology can be affirmed as a modality of science, one in which we
have the language and know-how wherewith understand tech-
nology were it to speak. These questions imply that there is an-
other who speaks to us, but instead of this other being another
subject, it is a material Thing to which we attribute our desire to
think science.
Science presents as something potentially knowable, inevitable
and a pathway to truth so far as its apparent inseparability from
quantification permits. Following scrutiny and interrogation of
phenomena and method, science uses analysis and calculation to
test hypotheses from which thoughts and meanings, under-
standings and conclusions result. However, as Rado Riha (2012, p
79) states in his discussion of Husserl, the relation between sci-
ence and meaning is anything but secure:
The presupposition of the Husserlian doctrine of science is
thus the equation between thought and meaning: there is
thought where there is meaning. Following Husserl’s path, a
conclusion imposes itself, namely: science does not think.
Science does not think to the precise extent that it
annihilates meaning [emphasis original].
The manifestation of science as method and technique is
affirmed through the materiality of objects, some of which we all
use. The meaning of these objects lies in their function and in this
way, certainly in today’s technological zeitgeist, material tech-
nology manifests as a realisation of science speaking to us via its
method and technique which have determined the character,
designation and constitution of such objects. Furthermore, both
the object and its function are readily graspable despite us not
really knowing or caring how these came about. This imperfect
knowledge goes hand in hand with technology presenting itself as
a science which speaks. However, there is a certain ambiguity in
science’s symbolic appropriation valuing particular forms of
exchange, even when this exchange is limited to recognition and
status. As Pierre Bourdieu (2004) suggests, scientific capital is
based on the negotiation of exchange, power and recognition
thereby directly implicating the mechanisms of capitalism into
the practice of scientific enquiry.
Given this situation how might we understand the role of
science and its manifestation as material technology within the
framework of capitalism? Riha considers that “science is not
useful to capitalism other than submitting itself under the
imperative of profitability” (2012, p 90). Material technology is in
part a result of science, yet because of its utility it functions in the
realm of the drive, not that of desire for knowledge. This is
somewhat perplexing given that material technology appears to
be an inevitable part of progress. A problem with material tech-
nology is that it potentially fails, malfunctions or provides only
relative responses. It seems that material technology is a discourse
which conflicts with the exacting condition of science. When we
are faced with failed material technology, we assume that science
too has failed us, yet it is the technology which we have cast as
our objet a which has not lived up to our expectations, for
example when our computer or smartphone doesn’t work prop-
erly. Our immediate response is to think that science itself has
failed and can no longer function as the object for our drive. In a
way this failure of technology has stopped us from thinking.
However, the failure we ascribe to science in the guise of a
technological object is paradoxical because it has not displaced our
faith that science can ultimately be counted on. Here, material
technology integrates capitalism into a cultural discipline influen-
cing a coding of the self. We are missing something crucial when
confusing science with technology in that science, unlike technol-
ogy, in order to function is not obligated to have an ideological
form. Technology must have such a form or it would not be the
device intended–it would be something else and thus be dependent
on something else. Here we have both misplaced technology as an
interiority of science and framed it within the capitalist conditions
of its production. In the quest for our enjoyment of material
technology, our jouissance, we have elevated this technology to the
position of what Lacan calls the big Other.3
The big Other4 for Lacan is best described as that which
inscribes the subject into the Symbolic Order.5 Slavoj Žižek6
articulates this well when he states (1997, unpaginated):
The big Other is somewhat the same as God according to
Lacan (God is not dead today He was dead from the very
beginning, except He didn’t know it…): it never existed in
the first place, i.e., the ‘big Other’s’ inexistence is ultimately
equivalent to Its being the symbolic order, the order of
symbolic fictions which operate at a level different from
direct material causality. (In this sense, the only subject for
whom the big Other does exist is the psychotic, the one who
attributes to words direct material efficiency.) In short, the
‘inexistence of the big Other’ is strictly correlative to the
notion of belief, of symbolic trust, of credence, of taking
what other’s say ‘at their word’s value.’
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0035-y ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:  38 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0035-y |www.nature.com/palcomms 3
A similar logic can explain our relationship with material
technology as that which enables a networking of the ‘self’. First,
it is important to consider what is meant by material technology
under capitalism. Although this covers a very broad range of
abundant objects, including the computer, the phone, the MRI,
interactive games, the light bulb, the recording machine, the robot
and so on, it is important to distinguish between these as con-
sumer objects and technology employed for the purposes of
knowledge and for the benefit of humanity and without expec-
tation of profit, for example, research technology7 concerning
climate change. Today we feel compelled to be subjects of a
specific material technology in which naïve liberalism merges
with science, a position of excess from where the functioning of
material technology unquestioningly establishes our day-to-day
lives. Žižek (2017, unpaginated) discusses technological dom-
ination as it problematically structures the subject when he says,
“[o]ur life, human life, our identity is reduced to a series of for-
mulas. So, we are effectively entering some kind of post human
universe where everything, our inner most identity can be
reduced to a formula.” The excess of material technology serves to
limit the subject.
Yet like the subject, technology is itself ambivalent in handling
this excess (which it represents and which the subject does not
know what do to with). For the subject, it appears that material
technology is also an inescapable mediator between itself and the
conditions of capitalism in which the subject is situated. Tech-
nology demands we declare ourselves, yet itself has nothing to
declare. It demands that we desire yet it is devoid of desire. It
demands that we speak yet it is inarticulate. In the opacity of
these demands, material technology possesses an anthro-
pomorphic quality; it ‘tricks’ us by operating as a gallantry of
lalangue notwithstanding that it is, for the most part, silent while
we are doing the speaking.
To illustrate this gallantry with excess, consider for example the
smartphone, which according to Adam Greenfield (2017, p 19)
“ranks among the most rapidly adopted technologies in human
history”. Although it is promoted as such this is not a simple
device: it displaces other material objects which we previously
relied upon, the book, the landline, street directories, traditional
methods of exchange and so on; using it is convenient, reliable
and even enjoyable. Here the smartphone has not only inter-
rupted some of the social forces, as well as the objects we pre-
viously used, it has through its position of dominance
reconfigured the subject’s interpellation within these social sys-
tems, conventions and forces. Our day to day lives are shaped by
the smartphone’s use and design; it can literally voice what we
want to hear yet we don’t have to return the call, we can be
speechless and at the same time immersed in enjoyment in
the power of language or more precisely, lalangue, which
thereby sustains jouissance of the signifier.8 The smartphone has
become, in the west at least, a part of our human condition
and of how we interact with the world. Whatever criticisms we
might level against the smartphone and its production,9 these
are obfuscated by its usually reliable functionality. The irony is
that although the smartphone has ushered in a communications
utopia, it has not changed the often mediocre, even boring
day-to-day communications and activities in our lives. Indeed, it
enables us to enjoy the banal. We have become dependent
on a technology which promises limitless access to knowledge
through simply being able to use such technology. This, of course,
is not the equivalent of thinking and our act of using the smart
phone is technical rather than a demonstration of scientific
know-how. And it is here that we need to return to a formal
definition and function of science, the foundation of material
technology. In addition to being subject to the scientific paradigm
science is conditioned by its underlying of “self-consistency and
correspondence with reality” (Callaghan, 2007, p 15). The sci-
ences (Pluth, 2012, p 97)
formalise and quantify the workings of nature; they discern
patterns and laws in the behaviour of their objects of study.
They designate objects (and I am using this word loosely
enough so that I would include with it non-objectal things
such as waves and forces), the properties of these objects,
and the relationships among these objects […] the sciences
can even be thought to give us a theoretical knowledge of
the real.
By contrast, material technology such as the smart phone
ensures that its science is instead understood as an experience
where meaning is embedded in wide-spread technological con-
sumption. However, such an interpretation of the nature of sci-
ence is limited to technology precisely because mass consumption
renders technology distinct chiefly by its widespread use. Use-
fulness has always been a driver of science but it is not a sole
driver. The usefulness of technology does not embrace scientific
thinking but is instead merely to response to joussiance.10
Technology’s distinctive logic enables the subject to at will appear
or disappear, to speak or not speak, thus desire of the subject of
technology can never fully reveal itself because it is obfuscated by
this very technology.
Further to these characterisations of science and of technol-
ogy’s interpellation within it, the question arises, is technology an
object of science? Arguably it is not. For Lacan, the objet a
is that which stands in for the cause of desire, meaning that
because we do not know what we desire, we replace it with an
object to represent our struggle with desire. Any material object is
merely an appropriation of desire because as Lacan states in
Écrits, the objet a ought to remain untranslatable; it is a
‘thing’ which is the remainder, the excess of the Symbolic Order.
(Lacan, 1966b, p 104):
The objet a is something from which the subject, in order to
constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ. This serves
as a symbol of the lack, that is to say, of the phallus, not as
such, but insofar as it is lacking. It must, therefore, be an
object that is, first, separable and, secondly, that has some
relation to the lack.
Here jouissance and desire are in tension regarding how to
handle excess. To be clear, desire is not aimed at a particular
object but rather to the act of desiring. This is important in the
context of deliberating new technologies because of the clear
implication that such technologies are not offering us something
to want, rather they are making desire possible. As Alenka
Zupančič (2011) attests, the object of desire is external to the duty
to desire. This entails that the object is both knowable and
unknowable and is acquired in the form of a pre-supposed
demand. Technology as the objet a is a logical signifier, a con-
tinuation of the linguistic exchange we rely upon to convey the
materiality we speak about and which to some extent affords us a
language enabling us to grapple with our symptom (that which
emanates from our subjective division). Although not itself
representational, technology has the function of representation
via its reconstruction of the subject with an object. Through such
reconstruction there is a suspended, teleological character in the
relation between subject and object, as well as between desire and
joussiance. Material technology and its utilisation afford a fidelity
to language (not to be confused with lalangue) but without
necessarily exposing the limitations of language. This abstraction
reveals an ethical conundrum: in deference to the contemporary
technological age one is suffused with not only the promise of
progress, but also (arguably) with the limitations within the
structure of technology of apprehending the subject. Nevertheless,
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we preserve a strange fidelity to technology in (mis)under-
standing it as (to use Badiou’s term) evental.
Let us return again to Lacan’s question: why can’t planets
speak? Just as we are certain that planets do not speak because the
laws of science preclude it, so also we can be certain that tech-
nology does not speak because it interpellates the subject within
the capitalist mode of production which itself restricts or limits
language. What precisely is the relationship between capitalism
and technology? Here a Marxist analysis is helpful. Two con-
sequences of improved technology under capitalism are that even
after deduction of the cost of technology, a proportion of its
benefits is seldom passed on to workers as their fair share but
instead entirely appropriated by the capitalist. Secondly, because
technology usually decreases the number of workers required,
competition amongst them leads to their increased poverty and
dependence. What drives this malign dynamic are those social
forces which not only determine value but which also lead to an
increasing wealth gap between the worker and the capitalist. As
Marx says (1844), “[t]he worker becomes all the poorer the more
wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power
and size. The worker becomes an even cheaper commodity the
more commodities he creates.”
In the context of Marx’s analysis, what is unique about tech-
nology under capitalism today? Todd McGowan (2016, p 39)
explicates this well in Capitalism and Desire: The Psychic Cost of
Free Markets:
Though capitalist subjects experience continuing dissatis-
faction when they attain each new and disappointing object,
they find satisfaction through the repetition triggered by the
perpetual search for the next commodity. This dynamic is
crucial to capitalism’s staying power. If it just offered
dissatisfaction with the promise of future satisfaction,
subjects would not tolerate the capitalist system for as long
as they have. But capitalism does provide authentic
satisfaction–the satisfaction of loss–in the guise of
dissatisfaction.
The constantly unsatisfying circulation of objects and the
repetitive nature of their production is a far cry from the crea-
tivity of scientific enquiry. Nor can such objects constitute
objet a firstly because objects produced under capitalism cannot
so readily sustain themselves as the object cause of desire,
as McGowan points out when discussing Marx’s Grundrisse
(2016, p 108):
Desires do not pre-exist the product that arrives on the
market to sate them. The product and the desiring
consumer form a dialectic relation with each other: the
commodity speaks to the possibility of a desire in the
consumer, and if it speaks successfully, the desire will form.
This casts light on Marx’s problematic assumption that we can
in the first place know and recognise desire and further that we
can then reflect this desire onto tangible, satisfying objects. Thus,
if Marx’s theory of production and consumption were to include
the objet a then the objet a would become no more than that
something produced by the workings of the market. It could be
argued that material technology’s capacity to generate desire is
more potent than merely responding to existing desire.
Secondly the object of technology cannot constitute objet a
because the character of the objet a is that it is not a present
object, nor an object yet to come but one that is not even in
existence. Lacan orients the objet a not as an empirical object but
rather some-thing beyond such an object, indeed as those
unconscious forces which allow for conscious interactions
between the subject and the object, as something indeterminate
that touches upon the Real.
In this way material technology triggers attainment of some-
thing that is not necessarily or altogether wanted; here material
technology is operating in the territory of joussiance rather than
of desire. Desire is not at stake. Instead, the status of a truth
propagated by material technology is upset. Žižek explores the
problem of truth as one interpellated within an ideological excess
which points towards obfuscation (2002, p 168):
The perspective of the critique of ideology compels us to
invert Wittgenstein’s “What one cannot speak about,
thereof one should be silent” into “What one should not
speak about, thereof one cannot remain silent”. If you want
to speak about a social system, you cannot remain silent
about its repressed excess. The point is not to tell the whole
Truth but, precisely, to append to the (official) Whole the
uneasy supplement which denounces its falsity.
Certainly, the status of truth is one which the subject grapples
with. We seek to detect the manifestation of truth in our day-to-
day lives, a manifestation which orients our choices, anchors our
physical realities and situates our ego, and we undertake this via
science and its various branches. Pluth (2012, p 97) too alerts us
to an important supplement, that although “truths are indeed
available to us in natural human languages” nevertheless,
[n]o matter how accurate one’s linguistic descriptions of the
workings of nature may be (if it is even possible for them to
be accurate, which I am not inclined to think), there is still a
separation between these linguistic descriptions and what is
going on in the real, which is accounted for more
adequately in abstract, formal languages.
Despite our smartphone allowing us to share communication,
despite the MRI machine capturing images of internal bodily
parts and despite the computer collecting and storing data that is
put in; despite our interactions with these material technologies,
there is no meta-language to speak of or to grasp. These tech-
nologies cannot be the object cause of our desire insofar as there
is no language which is conducive to their being verified as objects
of knowledge. As Lacan says in Écrits (1966a, b, p 727), we are
still very much caught up in constituting our subjective division.
This division is characterised by the pursuit of truth via accessi-
bility to material technology facilitating the drive towards
enjoyment. For Lacan, we are subjects of science, not of the object
which we cast as our contestable objet a11 (p 729):
To say that the subject upon [which] we operate in
psychoanalysis can only be the subject of science may seem
paradoxical… one is always responsible for one’s position
as a subject […]. There is no such thing as a science of man,
and this should be understood, because science’s man does
not exist, only its subject does.
Here Lacan is returning to the logic of structural linguistics
posited as a specific science in which the subject is oriented. He is
focusing on how the subject of science is actually excluded from
the very object it seeks to possess, that being science itself rather
than science representing something else (in this case material
technology). Herein lies a distinct separation between the subject
and knowledge, or more precisely for Lacan, the separation
between what he calls ‘conjectural’ science (human sciences) and
‘exact’ science (the remaining field of the scientific). He maintains
(1966a, b, p 733) that
[t]he opposition between exact sciences and conjectural
sciences is no longer sustainable once conjecture is subject
to exact calculation (using probability) and exactness is
merely grounded in a formalism separating axioms and
compounding laws from symbols.
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Given this position, what might be the object of science, which
for Lacan is also the object of psychoanalysis? About this he is
clear: there is no object, but rather, the function of the objet a,
which Lacan proposes as the ‘science of psychoanalysis’. The
function of das Ding, Freud’s Thing, which inscribes the subject
into language, lends a voice which speaks and which the subject
echoes.12 Thus the status of truth must include language and the
subject must face something which is an effect of the function of
objet a, namely deferment to our neurosis rather than to the
object of technology which represents confrontation with our
uncannily automated selves.
The struggle for articulation
Two important questions arise in the deliberation of desire and its
inscription into technology. First, how can we conceive a subject
of desire, and second, what is the function of fantasy in relation to
technology? Lacanian psychoanalysis suggests that because sub-
jects are structured by lack and desire, they attempt to fill this
uncomfortable convergence with an object. This object is both
attainable and impossible because although it is recognisable
there are restrictions on and limitations to its form and func-
tionality. Because of these restrictions and limitations, images of
fantasy are imposed upon the object thus making it difficult for
the subject to fully understand not only the object, but also the
subject’s relation to it. Furthermore because of resultant confu-
sion, subjects can never fully articulate precisely what will enable
them to traverse their object of fantasy and thereby fully submit
to desire. This confusion arises partly from subjects’ inability to
articulate desire but also from their inability to be convinced that
the object itself is the object par excellence. Thus, we remain
forever subjects of perpetual desire and lack, in search of the
illusory object through which we aspire to fully signify our desire.
In Interface Fantasy (2009) André Nusselder examines Lacan’s
concept of fantasy as being intrinsically tied to desire. Here he
states that fantasy is “the central concept of psychoanalysis” (p 3)
and foregrounds fantasy as the location of the subject of desire.
Here we consider Lacan’s formula for fantasy (Fig. 1).
What this means is that the divided or barred subject ($) is a
subject of desire in so far as the object cause of desire is where
fantasy engages with the Imaginary (<>) as a surrogate for this
object (objet a). For Žižek fantasy teaches us how to desire; it
mediates and structures this process through empirical objects.
Nusselder claims that in addition, fantasy has an interfacing role
of mediating the subject with an object. The object can be any-
thing as can the nature of its mediation with the subject, a
multiplicity exhibited in the intentional bi-directionality of the
character <>. This character stands for the mirror where
although two sides are always in view, what is on either side is
different: the barred subject of desire ($) and the image of the
object cause of desire rendered by fantasy (a) on the other. The
subject strives for unity and synergy between the self and the
object cause of desire. This implies that the subject will always feel
alienated from the object cause of desire (a) because the object is
alien to the subject and cannot be comprehended because it
cannot speak. An additional problem arises in the attempt to
articulate desire: to be a subject is to be a subject of desire,
however because desire cannot be named, the category of <>
gives a structure and form to desire which although supported by
language, fits poorly and therefore fails to convince the subject of
desire. It is this missing of the mark which reduces the subject to
struggling with fantasy as an impossible actuality that must be
lived with–if only because living fully within fantasy is either
ludicrous or psychotic. This mechanism of desire, although
contingent, manifests as a question which seeks to clarify the
confusion subjects have with their desire: Che vuoi? or more
precisely, what does the Other want from me? Here, the category
of <> is crucial in that it also functions to reflect the desire of the
Other. The important question, Che vuoi?, can be inverted and
reconfigured when we implicate technology with capitalism
because desire, like capital, is a distinctly social form. As Joan
Copjec maintains (1996), it is the repression of our desires as
social subjects that determines how desires are understood and
negotiated.
In addition to Lacan’s matheme of fantasy, it is also important
to consider his Capitalist Discourse, his fifth and arguably
unfinished discourse, which is formulated as shown in Fig. 2.
The interpretation of Lacan’s formula is as follows: the super-
ego (S1) operates as the master signifier and commands the
barred subject ($) to enjoy objet (a) in the form of consumer
goods, services and commodities (S2). Lacan’s theory of discourse
is intended to reveal those unconscious forces which inscribe the
subject into the social bond. Vanheule (2016, unpaginated) con-
ceptualises Lacan’s capitalist discourse succinctly when he states
that
[i]n the late 1960s and 1970s, Lacan occasionally discussed
the impact of capitalist culture on subject formation. In line
with his general idea that the human subject comes into
existence through the play of signifiers, which originate
from the symbolic order, in this period of his work he also
assumed that the symbolic order of capitalism moulds the
subject in a particular way. Capitalist culture affects the way
we deal with distress and suffering; it shapes the way we
relate to others; it determines the way the unconscious
functions; and it influences the kind of request for help that
an individual might extend to a psychoanalyst. Indeed,
early in the nineteen seventies indicated that the capitalist
discourse had started to replace the traditional discourse of
the master. The classic figure of the other, which largely
rests on the structure of the discourse of the master, had
faded away (Žižek, 1999), affecting the subject to the extent
that a reconsideration of how we work clinically is needed
(Miller, 1993).
For Lacan there is a precise command here: to enjoy! For Slavoj
Žižek (1992), this command becomes more nuanced in that it is
the command is to enjoy one’s symptom, that which emanates
from the convergence of lack and desire. The superego imperative
to enjoy promises that our symptom will be more exotic, com-
plex, sexy and so on. Here is the promise of better enjoyment.
However, with each consumption of enjoyment there is inevitable
disappointment and thus in our effort to hold on to desire, we
continually repeat the provocative image provided by the objet a.
With every permutation of this repetition, the image is slightly
different, more nuanced and morphing into that which we can
Fig. 1 Lacan’s matheme for the structure of fantasy Fig. 2 Lacan’s structure of the capitalist discourse
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0035-y
6 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:  38 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0035-y |www.nature.com/palcomms
only partially recognise. Hence, we continuously consume
because we are forever compelled to overcome our constitutive
lack as a mode of jouissance, that of bodily pleasure. The ethic of
production and consumption is for Lacan steeped in and struc-
tured by the libidinal economy. It is crucial to understand how
the limits of this economy function via the modality of prohibi-
tion. Prohibition has the function of igniting and maintaining our
guilt so that we don’t exceed the limit of our joussiance, our
enjoyment. Here, principles of ‘good’ and ‘reasonable’ provide
symbolic functions and contexts which are aspired to because
these are rewarded as desirable characteristics within the social
bond. Taking our theme of technology as an example, one might
own the latest and best mobile phone for its more practical
characteristics: convenience, work, access to loved ones, infor-
mation and so on. The additional applications for narcissistic
enjoyment accessorise the subject’s usage and valuation of the
device. This is not exactly an extension of the self, but more a
reflection of our a priori categories: with every new application,
upgrade, colour scheme and so on, we become a hologram in the
device. The device, it seems, is both a frame for our pleasure and
one to which we are duty-bound.
We don’t think about these elements because they are in
themselves rather boring, but we nevertheless enjoy them.13 We
see ourselves reflected not in the device but in our use of it and
this is a key element of how, within the field of technology we
wittingly interpellate and reproduce lack as a form of joussiance.
We seek fusion with the device in order to replicate ourselves as
mechanisms of desire. However, desire and fantasy are always
simultaneous, incomplete and in the process of formation. Robert
Pfaller (2014, p 3) wittily explicates this mechanism:
[c]omputer users know perfectly well that their machines
are not equipped to respond to encouragement, yet they
nonetheless talk persistently with their electronic darlings
(which are, incidentally sometimes given pet names) as if
they could respond; and when a machine experiences a
major mechanical breakdown, many users resort to crude
acts of violence, inflicting damage, hitting the machine, or
even going so far as throwing it out of the window, as if the
punished PC were actually capable of redeeming itself in
response to the painful experience.
It is important to remember that there is no subjectivity as a
form separate from the biological body: subjectivity is conditional
on the body we inhabit. That is, people and technology are
recognised as related and relatable but also as distinctive and
recognisably distinct. Regardless of this and taking on board
Pfaller’s important claim that technology plays a pivotal role in
staging and regulating fantasy and pleasure, it seems as if the
distinction between subjectivity and technology might not
have a function of demarcation despite this appearing to
be the case. Material technology demonstrates the effect of this
opacity in demarcation. When using our smart phone we have to
grapple with the realisation that we are deceiving ourselves when
at the same time we cannot resist attributing to the device
being beyond ourselves. Here desire takes on the staging of
technology as a natural or essential order beyond subjectivity
and herein lies its claim to be science. But this claim is no more
than a ruse because we handle technology differently from sci-
ence. Material technology stages and fills the void of lack and
pleasure, it facilitates mediation of otherness via its usage by us
and in relation to other subjects. In this way lack and fantasy
configure the subject as triggering deploying of impossible or
frustrated joussiance. The misreading of material technology as
science is our failing. We see technology as both supplementing
and appeasing our anxiety in being libidinally invested, and
at the same time as attempting to address the impossibility
of Lacan’s enigmatic claim: there is no sexual relationship.14 Thus,
all we have as mediator between desire and the fantasy of tech-
nology is the objet a, the fantasy object, notwithstanding that in
the absence of an object we have the tendency to create one and
even attribute to it the status of the untraversable das Ding.
Wo Es war, soll Ich werden15
What might be the effects of material technology were we to refuse
it as the twenty-first century objet a? For all of its flaws, capitalism
itself provides the syntax of a well-made modern language that we
can understand because it touches on actualities which affect our
life and frame our choices. Its failings manifest obviously enough in
gross inequality, wastage, environmental degradation and so on.
Capitalism is a well-made language but it is certainly not a unified
one insofar as although we demand, through modes of labour and
exchange, that objects speak for us, in fact they cannot. The lan-
guage we use when demanding that objects speak is one which
attempts to provide synergy with our enjoyment together with
some recognition of our desire. More than this, we act as if objects
do speak despite being fully aware of materiality’s failure to speak.
However, although objects do not speak they are also not silent in
that they have the potential and actual ability to convey truth or
lies, to outwit us, to convince us of falsities and to play upon our
imagination. Objects are impossible to fully grasp because we
cannot fully grasp ourselves and because we cannot fully grasp
what it might mean not to speak.
The reification of contemporary technology is a concomitant of
the modernist project which spelt the death of God: it captures
this crisis of faith by inserting a different Other, one which is
crucial in commandeering the masses. We have however failed to
anticipate how utterly unimaginative we can be: instead of
basking in the so-called freedom modernism afforded us, we seek
a new Master, one who is more reliable, visible, tangible and
useful. Thus, technology has emerged from the death of God.
However, technology’s identification as science (as our big Other)
is problematic and in this identification, we are complicit.
Although we frame science as affording us certainty, reliability,
validation, repetition, verification and so on, science’s break with
theology has not resulted in a more grounded and disinterested
big Other, quite the reverse. We have, as Žižek continually
reminds us, again fallen back on the dubious pleasure of belief,
this believing being the modality of the joussiance we crave, a
jouissance which promises an even better one the more we
believe: this is jouissance of the Other. Thus, belief in science as
the answer to the crisis of the times is both a return to modernism
and to a contemporary form of jouissance. Lacan however
reminds us that our vision of science as belief in science is very
much conditioned on theology from which the contemporary
world cannot therefore be divorced. We cannot simply dispense
with theology in favour of science. From here Lacan makes an
even stronger and controversial claim: that the very foundation of
modern science is theological insofar as whatever we affirm, deny,
doubt or take seriously is articulated as a subjective position, “I”.
This claim invokes Descarte’s cogito, I think, therefore I am.16
However, for Lacan, the word of “I” involves different positions
which are in tension with one another: the “I” of enunciation (I
think) and the “I” of statement (I am), the former referring to the
“I” of subjectivity and the latter to the “I” of ontology. What this
means is that the object itself is a source of distortion and fantasy
as there is no objet a without “I”. Žižek takes this further by
insisting that fantasy and ideology are complicit with each other.
In deliberating the tensions and contradictions that confront
our relationship with technology Stijn Vanheule (2016, unpagi-
nated) considers, through an intersection of Marx and Lacan, how
capitalist production operates via the command of jouissance:
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Capitalist production implies that one no longer works
solely in order to satisfy needs, and stops once they have
been met. Production continues beyond satisfying needs,
which results in a fetishist relation to surplus value
(Tomšič, 2012, 2015). Lacan (1968–1969, p 64–65)
concludes that the secret gain of surplus value is both the
product and the motor of the capitalist production system.
Yet, despite the appropriation of surplus value, Marx
stresses that the capitalist does not personally enjoy what he
gains. The capitalist is only the support that makes the
system run. Therefore, what the capitalist system produces
are suppositions and phantasies of gratification, while in
fact nobody enjoys (McGowan, 2013). Indeed, this is what
Lacan also stresses when addressing Marx’s socio-economic
analyses: ‘There is only one social symptom: each individual
actually is a proletarian’ (Lacan, 1975, p 187).
Here, capitalism is cast as unconscious unbehagen whose
function is unease created by enjoyment. In Capital and Affects,
The Politics of the Language Economy (2011) economist, Christian
Marazzi argues that it is the inscription of a neoliberal structure
within the economy which formalises a new kind of hidden
exploitation. He explains that the site of technology is deceiving
because it assumes an apolitical, virtual and level playing field
which one either uses or avoids. However, even if one chooses to
avoid sites of connected environments, one is necessarily a
reluctant participant, because the site of the virtual encompasses
access at any time to worldwide communities and networks. It is
the new public sphere, the manipulated ‘common space’ which
nevertheless has consequences for the subject. Here Marazzi
focuses on the “capitalist valorisation of linguistic processes” (p
11) as underlying the assumption of a common and objective
virtual space, a valorisation which suggests that this space is in
fact highly manipulated. He further claims that as a result, new
forms of exploitation and struggle interpellate the subject, not
into a refusal of fiscalization and exchange via technology but the
very opposite, a virtual re-shaping of the means by which goods
and services are produced (p. 15).
Alberto Toscano and Jeff Kinkle’s work on the ‘logistical
hypothesis’ (2015) substantiates the issue of symbolising capit-
alism trapped within its own tradition, by highlighting the pro-
blem of representation, by establishing a cartography tracking the
panorama of crisis. As an example they consider art and its
appropriation within the ideology of capitalism, arguing that the
capitalist imaginary is constituted within the image both as a
paradox of desire and an ‘absolute’ capitalist system, also as a
crisis arguably hidden within symptomatic trends and the chains
of commodities.17
It seems that capitalism is itself appropriating a crisis of faith,
reminiscent of what neoliberalism undergoes when confronted by
the adverse conditions of the individual. Here neoliberalism finds it
difficult to imagine a way out of the capitalist discourse: when
technological expansion is adverse to future conditions of the indi-
vidual, rather than this being interrogated, it is side-stepped through
rearticulating class analysis as, for instance the ‘precariat’ who may
or may not be offered contractual labour conditions. Such terms
reflect the excess of technological expansion: an environment
degraded by over-consumption, one in which there is no cash to
speak of, where items are bought online, debt accumulated and
repayment automatically deducted. This is the machine of capitalism
whose ideological structures and conditions remain in place, shiel-
ded by technology being understood as an explanatory transition
rather than framed as a structuring condition.
Fredric Jameson provides a further way in which to consider
the structural conditions (or more precisely, spatial awareness)
of capitalism. He attempts to demystify the perception that capital
is a monopoly implicit in the structure of experience. He says
(1990, p 348):
Too rapidly we can say that, while in older societies and
perhaps even in the early stages of market capital, the
immediate and limited experience of individuals is still able
to encompass and coincide with the true economic and
social form that governs that experience, in the next
moment these two levels drift ever further apart and really
begin to constitute themselves into that opposition the
classical dialectic describes as Wesen and Erscheinung,
essence and appearance, structure and lived experience
Jameson considers psychoanalysis as having something
important to offer when attempting to understand capitalism
within a logistical circuit. He argues that the ideology of capit-
alism presents as a totality both within itself and more pertinently
within class structures. Such a retention of class, Jameson argues,
is mapped both consciously and unconsciously as a specific
political experience. This mapping endorses a distinctively
Marxist approach which is also a problem: totality itself becomes
a symptom “of the increasing difficulties in thinking of such a set
of interrelationships in a complicated society” (1990, p 352).
Jameson argues that the ‘postmodern play’ with technology,
although a way of mapping unrepresentable things, must also
result in affect.
It is important to remember that a new language emanating
from technology does not necessarily portray what enjoyment
looks like, rather it merely presents the struggle to articulate
enjoyment via technology. Such techno-speak is always abbre-
viated and never promises to be full speech, despite its origin in
the boundless terrain of technology; it is consequently insufficient
when language and enjoyment are complicit. The convergence of
technology, capitalism and enjoyment within the messy con-
stitution of the subject and its struggle for articulation offers
different ways in which we can approach the subject as experi-
encing both mediatised enjoyment and frustration in the context
of capitalism’s staging of enjoyment.
We can now turn our attention to the task we have set, that of
tracking enjoyment and the fantasy of desire via the logic of
technology interpellated within the capitalist discourse. On the
face of it, technology as a libidinal tool appears little more than
masturbatory in that it exposes no more than a semblance of lack,
in other words of jouissance. Although apparently superficial, this
interpretation is the most accurate for trying to locate and
articulate enjoyment (but not desire). Returning to Lacan’s thesis
of non-rapport, were a sexual relationship possible, the semblance
of technology would come to replace the force of jouissance.
Despite technology’s apparent promise of filling the void of
desire, it ultimately fails because technology is an apparatus which
cannot itself desire or suffer lack. Desire places the subject as both
setting up the coordinates of fantasy and of being the primary
provocation of it. Hence the desiring subject sets up technology
both as the lost object and the one which is possibly recoverable
via jouissance.
‘What will you do with all that I say?’
The discussion thus far has focused on the assemblage of tech-
nology as a libidinal enterprise for the subject. The constitution of
the subject and the object is distinctive yet it is also alienating.
Alienation has the function of negotiating visibility and repre-
sentation. This is significant because it entails that the subject is
demanding that the objet a (the Imaginary) be in place of the
Symbolic as a way of knowing the Real. Consequently, the subject
is forced to struggle, via metaphor and metonymy, towards
greater accessibility to language, as well as towards how he/she
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can access pleasure and engage the drives. Here it is important to
consider how desire for articulation is stored and contained.
Antonio Negri argues that power, subjectivity and labour are
characterised through technology as automatous (1991). This
absorption of technology is, as Marx puts it, a realisation of
capital, in which the worker is “superfluous” to the labour process
(1858/1993, p 605).
We have already argued that technology is an ontological
challenge by science yet at the same time we reify technology as
that which in part subjectivises us. One of the most appealing
ways in which we might approach this is through an examination
of the devices themselves. For example, mediatised spaces pre-
sented by mobile technologies offering social networking and
access to instant information bring to mind Descartes’ discussion
of the body’s appearance as opposed to its mechanics (this being
part of his questioning of how the immaterial can influence the
material and vice versa). Descartes’ enquiry anticipates a con-
temporary problematic concerning both the illusion of and fas-
cination with what might exist (if anything) beyond immediate
appearance. Žižek contends that we do not even know anything
about immediate appearance and such postmodern scepticism is
found in recent commentary regarding the subject’s interpellation
with technology. Robert Pfaller illustrates this when he critically
asserts that instead of producing pleasure, the affective condition
of fantasy produces the illusory phenomenon of self-esteem:
“people do believe in anything else but themselves” (2014, p 11).
The contemporary use of and dependence on technology both
upholds and contradicts this postmodern turn when we take into
account its potential for failure and in so doing enable a return to
Descartes’ enquiry, as well as to both Lacan’s structuring of the
subject as a subject of desire and to the capitalist structures which
attempt to regulate subjectivity. We feel certain particular forms
of technology are essential for our very existence, yet at the same
time we resent the status of such technologies in our lives. Pfaller
(2014, p 5) highlights this ambiguous position of the subject who
is contending with the fantasy of an object, as “an imagination
without an image”, this being a kind of self-deception of which we
are nevertheless well aware.
Mediatisation is the automation of subjectivity and eventually
comes to rival it through both staging and maybe even dismissing
desire. A problem arises in that desire and technology are not
intrinsically bound, rather they occupy the idiosyncratic space of
fantasy. Even in its neo-pragmatic form, technology does not
stand in for the subject’s desire. We cannot operate like machines
and trust the devices which impose upon us a linear version of
our complexities. Desire is not a utility to be dispensed with or
replaced by jouissance when we can no longer trust recognition of
our interpellation within technology.
Lacan provocatively states in Seminar XVII (1969–1970),
“What will you do with all that I say? Will you record it on a little
thing and organise soirees by invitation only?” Of course, it is
widely acknowledged by Lacanians today that his theorisations
will inevitably be entered into the University discourse. However,
Lacan is himself initiating another preserving power–one that he
could not predict at the time–the power of technology as a
mediating force between the subject and the desire for articula-
tion. The “little thing” he so amusingly refers to appropriates
discourses of speech within the ecology of media which structure
the recording, storing and transmission of sounds and voices.
Technology appropriates the exploration and dynamics of orality
and influences one’s approach to the choice and usage of its
products. Here the objects of media are not merely technological,
they have the ability to serve an intention, to be arresting and to
seize opportunities for articulation. Notwithstanding this urgency
to speak, technology simultaneously re-appropriates a desire to
resist speech, to simply not speak. German cultural thinker,
Friedrich Kittler considers the freedom of ‘unspeaking’ to be a
form of language in crisis and a provocation towards a for-
malisation of freedom.18 This provocation is salutary because it
directly implicates and situates the will-to-jouissance as a way to
bear the ongoing crisis of language.19
The subject for ‘late’ Lacan is an entity of irreducible lack.
Lorenzo Chiesa (2007, p 6) articulates this well when describing
the Lacanian subject: “the real other as the inherent impasse and
precondition of the Symbolic–which must actively be confronted
and assumed”. This subject is marked through contours of lack
and eventually subsumed as subjectivised lack. We are born into
language, subjected to and submersed in it, yet we are unable to
fully harness it or escape the problem that language offers merely
a specular identification with our subjective lack. Insofar as we are
linguistically always in production we are thereby alienated from
the Other for which we yearn: that is, we are subjected to lan-
guage and to its laws but can never be Masters of them. The
distinction here is between language and speech, speech being the
execution of language by the subject. However, the subject is
already alienated insofar as language precedes subjectivisation.
More so, language is the only mediator between subjects. How-
ever, language fails because one can never say all that one truly
desires because communication can never fully convey desire,
enjoyment and lack. Nevertheless, Lacan suggests that full
speech20 not only has the potential to overcome alienation but is
also a counterpoint to it because within the failure of speech,
another intention or truth is revealed. Let us here return to sci-
ence. For Chiesa, the question is not about whether science
eclipses metaphysics but rather of how science can be inclusive of
Lacanian psychoanalysis. Language certainly holds the key to
accounting for the dissatisfactions and disappointments of con-
sumerism. Yet there is a paradox here: although language is a
significant propellant of human relations it is also ambivalent and
ambiguous. For Lacan, we are always close to the object upon
which we gaze and this minimal distance is a necessary condition
of the subject’s dependence on language. Yet at the same time, the
truth for Lacan can only be partially said: “half-saying is the
internal law of any kind of enunciation with the truth” (Lacan,
1959–1960, p 126). This is the linchpin holding in place Lacan’s
designation of science. It refers to the structures within which the
subject is entangled, to the struggle experienced by the subject in
relation to both the incompleteness of language and our intrinsic
separation from it. Language is itself a fantasy concealed in its
status as objet a.
It is important here to note that for Lacan the object comes
into existence via a process of negation, in other words, it is the
confirmation of the negation of the object which reveals it to the
subject (Lacan, 1961–1962 cited in Chiesa, 2006, p 81–82):
There is no more, and not at all less, in the idea of an object
conceived of as not existing, than the idea of the same
object conceived of as existing, because the idea of the
object not existing is necessarily the idea of the object
existing with, in addition, the representation of an exclusion
of this object by the present reality taken as a whole.
Thus, for an object to be named is for it to be counted as one
marking a symbolic relation. The object is a possibility arising
from nothing, a space from which both nothing and nearly
everything provides a path towards its enunciation. Simply put,
the object exists precisely because it could be said not to exist.
Technology does not always allow us to fall back on the
rhetorical declarations and sensibilities of lack and pleasure. The
immediacy technology brings is both confronting and precarious
in not allowing language to be even partially articulated or desire
to be fully expressed. Regardless of the medium employed,
transparency in one’s discourse cannot be fully realised within
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language. For Kittler the reason for this opacity is obvious –
“tricks, whether in technology or love, or in war, are strategies of
power” (1997, p 97) and these provide ways of doing things
without words. In embracing technology, we assume the condi-
tion of the ‘human machine’ while at the same time continuing to
desire, to love and be loved. Yet we as subjects realise that both we
and the technology we use are subject to malfunction. Our pursuit
of desire under the conditions of technology manifests as textual
materialism which transpires through our illusory ability to
control technology whilst at the same time being confronted with
both the pursuit and the limitations of joussiance. Textual
materialism is (a kind of) gallantry of subjective division in that
being disembodied, it can never fully seduce us because we are all
the time aware of its insufficiency. As subjects under capitalism
we do not get to choose our joussiance because it is our rela-
tionship with material technology which both endeavours yet fails
to capture lalangue. Because our relationship with material
technology under capitalism is fraught, it can be expressed only
through jouissance. We articulate ourselves via technology,
although we rarely speak; we struggle with it, although there is
little explicit combat. Material technology reminds us that we are
bombarded with images of destitution despite our trying to
establish a preserving and intentional critical distance from the
world. Today technology makes movement, speech and struggle
not only possible but bearable for us. We cannot both traverse
jouissance and desire a future because we cannot see beyond an
all-encompassing technology. Thus, our struggle emanates from
the capitalist conditions which dominate our daily lives.
Defamiliarising Enjoy-ment
It might be said that technology is a detritus, a waste-residue of
capitalism. This left-over provides enjoyment of capitalism, although
such enjoyment is infused with subjective anxiety. Here an interesting
bi-directionality emerges where technology produces alternative
directions between the subject and itself. There is a relationship
between the codified language of technology (that which structures
the Symbolic) and our transmission of it being dependent on the
network of signifiers in which we are integrated. Such a science of
syntax entails that we are subjects of technology, a more or less
comfortable position except that we are still faced with our libidinal
economy. Lacan was certainly familiar with cybernetic theory as it
ordered things and subjects (Lacan, 1978/1954–1955, p 306):
…[W]e come upon a precarious fact revealed to us by
cybernetics–there is something in the symbolic function of
human discourse that cannot be eliminated, and that is the
role played by the imaginary.
It is here that we can recognise jouissance as subjective pleasure,
where the image and the body are synchronised in delivering the
most potent sensory impression. Not being an object of science,
material technology speaks directly to the libidinal body, giving us
the illusion that because it is interpreted through codes and textual
signs it is somehow trustworthy. This illusion does have another
more poignant function: although material technology is an excess
it nevertheless provides a symbolic solution for its suppression.
Material technology is a surrogate of science because it separates
the speaking body from the object but without entirely isolating
the effect of it being an excess. Here it occupies the domain of the
Imaginary is at its most potent. The Imaginary constitutes the
subject and cannot therefore be eliminated even by technology.
Rather, material technology ensures joussiance and its unbehagen.
Science as our Other will always be left inaccessible and its mys-
tery always left at the level of the symptom. Thus, material tech-
nology provides for a jouissance of excess ensuring that the
impasse of science will never be traversed. This is because meaning
cannot be extrapolated from syntax alone and the possibility of an
encounter with that part of language beyond syntax provides
anxious enjoyment not only with materiality but also with a new
and unfamiliar enjoyment. We can never assume that we will
probably enjoy our interaction with things. We cannot really
objectify things or even ourselves through our use of technology
because we are seduced also by its virtualising power. More than
this there is little consistency in our use of technological devices
because our subjectivity is, as Nusselder (2009) attests structured
largely by socio-symbolic discourses. Material technology cannot,
despite our misinterpretation of it pin down or secure the subject
because this is simply not its goal. Instead, we feel compelled to
enjoy our not-knowing, even disinterest, through our incorpora-
tion and libidinal investment in virtualisation (the Imaginary of
technology). This recasting of enjoyment refuses a larger propo-
sition, the taken-for-granted binary of post-modern thinking: that
science is the handmaiden of technology because it locates the
rational subject as unwittingly interpellated within technology.21
Might this recasting enjoyment as acceptance that there is no
meta-language (particularly of material technology) be the manner
through which we can experience a more contemporary form of
subjectivisation? What I mean here is that the embodied experi-
ence of using material technology–our interpellation within it–is
an appropriation of language, a semblance of lalangue in which we
are psychically invested. We inhabit the surface of material tech-
nology for moments in time and that is all. More than this, we rely
on the Imaginary to do so because we want to preserve that which
is most important to us and which material technology threatens
to take away: to be recognised for our difference, l’identification.
Material technology does this via a specific character of jouissance
because it appears in the Symbolic as a device which does not
merely exist but which exists for the benefit of everyone under
capitalism. This structuring of jouissance both animates it and
leads to subjective disquiet because what is at stake is how we
handle subjective division. It seems we are duty-bound to enjoy
material technology and at the same time have a moral obligation
to do so because technology is cast as a representation of life. Such
unbehagen emanates from alienation triggered by the devices
which we use but do not fully know. Here Marx’s analysis of the
subject’s relationship with machinery is pertinent: the machine is
where objectified labour confronts living labour and where we are
no longer an authority on either the device or its production
notwithstanding we utilise and fetishise it. This ‘de-ontological
status’, as Antonio Negri puts it, quantifies the self because in
attempting to measure the affective it speaks directly to the limits
of one’s knowledge. Object-ontology has offered the illusion of an
automated, depoliticised or post-political discursive space.
Although material technology appears abstracted from politics, in
fact it is not because it subordinates the subject as being complicit
with capitalism. Rather than liberating us either from the burden
of labour or the pursuit of surplus-value, material technology has
instead alienated us even further from the task of thinking.
Let us return to our original question: can technology speak?
Here, Rado Riha (2012) provides us with a clue emanating from
science: science certainly thinks, despite it being in the traditional
domain of non-thought. However, if are to interrogate technology,
then this must include two important characterisations (accord-
ing to Riha): firstly, that technology is a question of science and
secondly, that technology is burdened with the extra task of self-
affirmation. Technology is not a self-sufficient ontology of
knowledge, rather it is to use Fabio Vighi’s words, “sustained by
the formal deadlock of reason” (2015, p 3). Such a deadlock is
considered by Zupančič (2011) as a problematic choice between
autonomy and pathology. That we are strangers to ourselves is
played out in the very devices we use in trying to locate our lack.
This foundation of false representation both constitutes us as
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divided and exposes the very division we rely on. Because the
Other we rely on to characterise us is also inconsistent–that is
marked by lack–we are free only to feel guilty and experience
unbehagen. When it comes to technology, we are in the position
of non-choice regarding our duty to it.
To locate this deadlock, we must ponder the subject’s alienation
in its relationship with technology. Although language is a tool the
subject uses in addressing alienation, the subject’s relationship with
language is itself alienating. Although this sounds odd, capitalism
as manifested in material technology can be ‘heard’ via the Marxian
maxims of labour, exchange, surplus-value and accumulation,
despite it its inability to speak. Although enjoyment of material
technology is in many ways imaginary, the syntax of capitalism has
the potential to make enjoyment possible in that the subject
operates as an ontological interruption between science and
material technology. Here jouissance takes on a more ambiguous
hue: although technology itself provides a materiality for enjoy-
ment, the subject’s interpellation within it marks a different quest,
that of foregrounding pleasure which is nevertheless, unlocatable.
Material technology under capitalism is at best a response to the
emergence of new symptoms arising from technology. In providing
data in place of knowledge, material technology upsets the subject’s
fall-back position of transparent rationality. We have technology as
our Other which is both distracted and which distracts us. However,
what constitutes this fantasy (mediated by the human-technology
interface) are the continual messy forces of capitalism. Here Roland
Barthes (1981) reminds us about not being so quick to merge the
object with its representation, his ça-a-été [that-has-been] insists that
we raise doubts about what we witness. If we take Barthes seriously,
our enjoyment itself is at stake; it can be a form of interruption only
if we only enjoy the position of interpreting data. There is no
determining imago to speak of because subjectivity has more
potency than the illusions surrounding our relationship with tech-
nology. This continual quest for (and clinging on to) enjoyment can
be understood as material technology taking the place of impossible
absolute silence, as an inevitable emanation of repressed tension
between constraint and autonomy. With this intended inscription of
alienation, material technology functions as the law of the Father. As
Richard Boothby rightly asserts this our fundamental relation to the
Lacanian mirror stage: we are estranged from the very image we
project (2001, p 141). This tension is transfixing for the subject
because much material technology is literally a mirrored signal
wherein self-representation cannot be fully deciphered. Material
technology provides the comfort of knowing that something exists
outside one’s inner monologue but it does not promise knowledge of
anything in particular. Despite our desire for it to do so, material
technology does not say anything: it is messy and confused, a
reminder that we have an unconscious. More than this we must
confront material technology as no more than a category of science;
it is not science but rather an indisputable error of language, a
recognition that we are fallible and like technology, prone to mal-
function. From this position of frustration, we can only imagine, as
emanating from the singular and imprecise form of technology, a
language yet to come. To recognise this language is not to dispense
with the object but to confront our unfamiliarity with the fetishized
object. We are bombarded with material objects, we feel suffocated
by them yet are not sure what to do with all this waste and excess.
Our inability to recognise and control desire harnesses our will to
jouissance thereby endowing technology with a unique character for
social reproduction. Our response to this could be via the science of
psychoanalysis because this has the required structure and agility to
mobilise the subject towards scientific disinterestedness, to refuse
dissolution in material technology and to locate attachment beyond
technology. Here we can reject the great post-industrial com-
mandment that material technology be enshrined as our Other.
We can refuse reduction of the subject to an automaton and instead
embrace disinterest as a pivot from which to handle both jouissiance
and unbehagen. Here we can surrender to Zupančič’s (2017) posi-
tion: it is the object itself which disorients ontology by indexing the
gap in subjective being. The object will never be able to fully signify
subjectivity because the body is invested in jouissance while the drive
is invested in the fantasy of impossible structures. The subject who
chooses to think about what is at stake concerning subjective divi-
sion (that is, being locked within the repetition of the symptom) is
no longer merely a product of but a challenge to the totalising and
symbolic effects of capitalism.
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Notes
1 Mario Biagioli (2012; 2015) has written on how the capitalist discourse implicitly and
explicitly constructs an important tension in the science community, that of remaining
disinterested while all the time conceding to (obligatory) economic and social demands
to deliver what is useful within symbolic capital and intellectual property.
2 Lacan never gave up on the capacity for psychoanalysis to think: it is a condition for
thought. Rado Riha says about science that “it is good for thinking” (2012, p 85).
Lacan claims similarly for psychoanalysis.
3 Dotan Lesham (2017, p 82) discusses how the Platonic orientation towards ‘self-
knowledge’ as a human capability to ‘know God’ confronts one with an indisputable
lack manifesting through the limitations of human language. He claims that
knowledge is harnessed by language but is then diverged rather than dispensed to all
because the political economy directs its gaze away from knowledge. Here, the
position of science is similar–the inability to fully know science is employed as a
method which directs the politics of social reproduction.
4 Also referred to as the Other.
5 Lacan’s Symbolic Order is determined by the registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic
and the Real. The Imaginary contains the mirror-stage which highlights the ego and
reflects discrepancies between individuals’ sense of selfhood and that of their image.
The Symbolic is the dimension of language through which subjects are inscribed into
the Symbolic Order. The Real is that which is difficult to be represented, said or
known and is “carved up by language” (Myers, 2003, p 25; Žižek, 1991).
6 Žižek (2014, p 119) offers a succinct account of the Symbolic dimension of the big
Other when he states that it is, “the invisible order that structures our experiences of
reality, the complex networks of rules and meanings which makes us see what we see
the way we see it (and what we don’t see the way we don’t see it).”
7 This includes not only technology used in consumer goods, but also additional
technological expertise which is part of the wider logistical technological field,
discussed at length by Toscano and Kinkle (2015). I acknowledge that Lacanian
psychoanalysis has limits in dealing with the object of ‘logistical technology’. There is
a logic of the signifier but no ‘logistic’ of the signifier. The objet a is never consistent
as a field of its own, whereas the materiality of logistical technology supports our
everyday interactions without us even being aware of it. It is problematic to assume
that psychoanalytic theory alone can satisfactorily address logistical technology as
effectively as it does personal consumer technology.
8 In Seminar XXIII: The Sinthome, Lacan talks of being “rendered speechless”
(1975–1976, p 146) through the experience of listening to chamber music. He talks of
this as a process of stupefaction conditioned by lalangue.
9 Adam Greenfield (2017) discusses how the production of the smartphone is
dependent on damaging extraction of natural resources, the exploitation of labour,
low wages and so on.
10 I am here reminded of Aaron Schuster’s, The Trouble with Pleasure (2016) where he
claims that whereas jouissance is unsettling, pleasure “keeps you within a fairly
buffered limit” (p 118–119). Maybe the smart phone for example, operates as a device
which pulls jouissance back into the modality of pleasure, thus rendering it a ‘useful’
pleasure rather than threatening.
11 Pluth (2012, p 99) makes the claim that the object of science is not objet a, but rather
“a development, and indeed, a logic”. He goes on to elaborate the philosophical
project of science - “what philosophy ends up discerning is a basic logical structure
for the becoming of beings” (ibid). For Pluth, there is no object of science.
12 In Écrits (1966, p 736) Lacan recounts Freud’s allegorical figure who is recognisable
only in a subjective form through the promise of truth.
13 Alfie Bown’s interesting paper, Algorithmic Control and the Revolution of Desire
(2016) considers psycho-geography as a context within which people use technology.
He discusses surveillance as a method from which technology is appropriated as a
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form of political intervention, as well as a leisure time activity, maintaining that in
using the same device for both purposes, constraints of geography and temporality
are up to a point, transcended.
14 It is important to understand what lies behind this claim. In 1972 Lacan published his
famous L’Etourdit in which he reminds us that there is no sexual relationship because
ultimately, we are alone in our relationship with others and that therefore in the
function of sex, two people remain separate via pleasure, rather than being united as
two subjects. For Alain Badiou (2012) love has the potential to fill the void left by this
absence of sexual relationship. What Lacan too is saying is that because jouissance
alone cannot establish a bond between two subjects, sexual relationship is an
impossibility without the mediation of love. Furthermore desire itself relies on
mediation between the subject and objet a.
15 Originally stated by Freud and translated by Lacan in Écrits, (1966a, b, p 734) as
“where it was, there must I come to be as a subject.”
16 Descarte’s cogito speaks to an affirmation of self-identity, that the subject who thinks
at one moment must be the same as the one who thinks at the next because what
relates these moments of thinking is memory guaranteed by God. However, although
Lacan appreciates the force of the cogito as an explication of the subject, he
nevertheless affirms that psychoanalysis and science is against historicisation and the
a priori assumption of God’s existence.
17 Here I am reminded of an important question posed by Gabriel Tupinambá: What
are the conditions, economic, social and otherwise, which make psychoanalysis
possible, even viable, in precarious times? His focus on temporality allows for the
constructing of conceptual tools enabling psychoanalysis to frame its own praxis. His
current work (Tupinambá, 2017) focuses on logisitics as the material basis of the
signifier circulating within broad sets of practices, which include but are not limited
to the field of the technological.
18 Kittler is suggesting that technological conditions are bound up within ontology. This
claim and his style of argumentation are aptly summed up in his well-known dictum:
Nur was schaltbar ist, ist überhaupt: “Only that which is switchable, exists”, or more
precisely, “only that which can be switched, can be”. What Kittler is saying here is
that we can understand knowledge only in terms of those cultural artefacts we use to
employ its possible manifestation.
19 For both Kittler and Lacan (although differently) this formalisation of speaking
situates freedom as a self-styled historical and interpretative problem. Both thinkers
theoretically dismantle language and its relation to material objects, thereby
abstracting the subject into a formalisation; Lacan via the subject of desire and Kittler
through the subject’s interpellation with technology.
20 Lacan states that “the function of language in speech is not to inform, but to evoke”
(1966a, b, p 299) and he draws on Heidegger in making the distinction between full
and empty speech. Full speech, also referred to as true speech, is close to the subject’s
desire, as “it is in recognition of one person to another” (Evans, 1996, p 194). Empty
speech is where “the subject is alienated from his/her desire” (p 124). It is through
speech that one can articulate the truth of one’s desires, the most unencumbered full
speech being during free association.
21 Here I again refer to Pierre Bourdieu’s claim (2004) that science and the scientist
need to understand the context in which knowledge is constructed and perpetuated.
For Bourdieu today’s scholar, scientist, philosopher or thinker is not only not free but
also (un)consciously self-interested because aggressive conditions of capitalism now
structure the academy, knowledge has become ‘symbolic capital’ and the traditional
position of disinterested thinker is not tenable because scholars are driven by rewards,
whether they be notoriety, prestige or even a knowledge-claim. Bourdieu’s position is
critiqued by Jacques Rancière (2004) who maintains that Bourdieu’s thesis, founded
on inequality, is fundamentally flawed because it is afforded too much agency for a
discourse concerning the very foundations of knowledge. Rancière maintains that
Bourdieu’s staging of inequality as the primary limitation to knowledge is a claim to
truth made representable and predictable. This for Rancière is at best paradoxical
because Bourdieu is assuming particular processes of social reproduction of
inequality and exclusion, and in order to legitimate their potency he engages the very
concept of disinterestedness which is (arguably) in place to prevent inequality and
exclusion. We might add that although capitalism structurally influences scholars,
like anyone else, it does not necessarily annihilate our critical facilities.
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